

University of Cyprus MAI650 Internet of Things

Vasos Vassiliou September - December 2023



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility









CS6xx Internet of Things (8 ECTS)

Course purpose and objectives: The purpose of the course is to provide an overview on IoT tools and applications and to introduce to students hands-on IoT communication concepts through lab exercises.

Learning outcomes: Upon completion of this course, students will be able to explain the definition and usage of the term "Internet of Things" in different contexts. More specifically, the students will know how to apply the knowledge and skills acquired during the course to build and test a complete, working IoT system involving prototyping, programming and data analysis

Teaching methodology: interactive face-to-face lectures, group activities and discussions, in class/lab activities, student presentations and guest lectures or significant recorded public lectures

Assessment: Final exam (50%), midterm exam (20%) and assignments/project (30%).



Co-financed by the European Union



Main text:

Rajkumar Buyya, Amir Vahid Dastjerdi, Internet of Things Principles and Paradigms, Morgan Kaufmann; 1st edition, 2016

J. Biron and J. Follett, "Foundational Elements of an IoT Solution", O'Reilly Media, 2016.

Other reading:

Jamil Y. Khan and Mehmet R. Yuce, Internet of Things (IoT) Systems and Applications, 2019, ISBN 9789814800297

David Hanes, Gonzalo Salgueiro, Patrick Grossetete, Robert Barton, and Jerome Henry, IoT Fundamentals: Networking Technologies, Protocols, and Use Cases for the Internet of Things, 2016, Cisco Press.





INTRODUCTION

Security and Privacy in IoT - Core

CONTENTS


- 1. IoT Security and Privacy
- 2. Types of Attacks
- 3. Intrusion Detection Systems
- 4. Secure Communication



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility







INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES

Upon completion of this introductory unit, students will be:

- 1. familiar with the IoT Architecture and Security Layers
- 2. familiar with the different types of Attacks
- 3. familiar with the Intrusion Detection Systems
- 4. familiar with the different secure communications protocols







oT Security and Privacy




Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility





IoT Framework






Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility





IoT Framework - Smart Grid



Sensor



RFID

Camera






IoT Infrastructure

Application Layer

Network Layer

Perception Layer / Network of Things









IoT Infrastructure

IoT Applications

• The device and how well is protected










IoT Infrastructure

Network Layer

• Internet










IoT Infrastructure

Perception Layer / Network of Things

- Uncontrollable environment
 - Physical intervention
- Via the Internet





Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility








IoT Infrastructure

Network Layer

Network Layer

Perception Layer / Network of Things










Security Layers






Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility





Security Layers

Preventive Layer










Security Layers

Detective Layer










Security Layers

Response Layer









Types of Attacks



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility





IoT Types of Attacks

Network Layer

Physical

Link

Network and Routing



Attack
Jamming
Tampering
Collisions
Exhaustion
Unfairness
Interrogation
Neglect and Greed
Homing
Misdirection
Black holes
Sink hole
Sybil
Selective Forward
HELLO Flood





Physical Layer Attacks

Take advantage their physical limitations

- Jamming Attack
 - Constant Jammer
 - Deceptive Jammer
 - Random Jammer
 - Reactive Jammer
 - Prevention: Spectrum communication: Spread the signal Cryptography Schedule switching Error bit correction



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

- Tampering Attack
 - Physical destruction
 - Prevention: Tamper proof Physical Location





Link Layer Attacks

- Resource overhead
 - Energy overhead
 - Computational and memory overhead



- Attacks
 - Collision
 - Disrupt packet while in transmission
 - Prevention: Error code corrections
 - Exhaustion
 - Corrupt last portion of the packet
 - Unfairness
 - Deprive the device to use the channel for transmitting
 - Prevention: smaller frames
 - Interrogation
 - RTS/CTS protocol





Network and Routing Layer Attacks

- Exploit vulnerabilities in routing protocols
 - Lure Traffic
 - Drop packets



- Attacks
 - Neglect and Greed
 - Homing
 - Misdirection
 - Selective Forward
 - Blackhole
 - Selective Forward and Blackhole
 - Sinkhole
 - Wormhole
 - Sybil
 - Hello Flood





Network and Routing Layer Attacks

Attacks

- Neglect and Greed
 - Neglects to forward packets
- Homing
 - Locating critical resources
- Misdirection
 - Misdirect packets to wrong path
- Selective Forward
 - Select which packets to forward
- Blackhole
 - Lure traffic towards the compromised node



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

- Selective Forward and Blackhole
 - Luring traffic
 - Selectively dropping packets
- Sinkhole
 - Pretending to be the Sink
- Wormhole
 - Redirect traffic
- Sybil
 - Multiple identities
- Hello Flood
 - Broadcast HELLO packets using more powerful transceiver





Application Layer Attacks

- Passive vs Active attacks
- Passive
 - Violates network's privacy
- Active attacks
 - Disrupt network's functionality and data reliability



Co-financed by the European Union





IoT Types of Attacks

Network Layer

Physical

Link

Network and Routing



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

Attack		
Jamming		
Tampering		
Collisions		
Exhaustion		
Unfairness		
Interrogation		
Neglect and Greed		
Homing		
Misdirection		
Black holes		
Sink hole		
Sybil		
Selective Forward		
HELLO Flood		





Intrusion Detection System



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility






IoT Security Infrastructure

- Detective Layer
 - Intrusion Detection Systems
 - Network monitoring
 - Two main mechanisms
 - Pattern detection
 - Anomaly Detection









Intrusion Detection Techniques

Signature Detection

- Also known as
 - Pattern detection
 - Misuse detection
- Known attacks
- Requires
 - Memory: store attack signatures
 - Computational power: compute every traffic's signature on the fly



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

- Advantages
 - Detect most (if not all) known attacks)
- Disadvantages
 - Cannot detect new attacks
 - Requires updating the signature database





Intrusion Detection Techniques

Anomaly Detection

- Known and novel attacks
 - Abnormal behavior: Deviation of normal behavior
- 2 phases
 - Training
 - Deployment
- Training
 - Defining: What is normal behavior



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

- Deployment
 - Evaluation the detection technique
- Advantages
 - Detection of novel attacks (no zero-day attacks)
- Disadvantages
 - High false alarm rates





Intrusion Detection Techniques

Anomaly Detection

- Detect known and new attacks
- High false alarm rates
- Requires training of the detection algorithm
- Defining normal behavior is the key
- Most efficient when training with both normal and abnormal behavior



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

Signature Detection

- Detects known attacks
- Zero-day treats
- Computing the new treat's signature offline
- Requires updating the database frequently
- Requires memory and computational power






Location of IDS

Locally at each device

- Self-detection
- Monitor internal device data










Globally / Gateway

- The Sink node, the gateway device between the network of things and the Internet
- Monitor data from the network of things and the requests to the network of things



Co-financed by the European Union










Distributed

- Dedicated device nodes or more powerful nodes
- Can also be the Sink
- Monitor neighboring data



Co-financed by the European Union








End point devices

 User devices monitor data coming from the network of things and request to the network of things










Ideal IDS placement

 The ideal IDS placement would be to place an IDS at all devices throughout the communication path to ensure suspicious traffic is detected before the virus propagates to the whole network.



Co-financed by the European Union





MAI4CAREU

Master programmes in Artificial Intelligence 4 Careers in Europe

Anomaly Detection Techniques

- Applying Thresholds
- Game Theory
- Fuzzy Logic
- Machine Learning
- Biologically Inspired
- Statistical Modeling



Co-financed by the European Union





IoT Security Measures

Physical Layer Security Measures

	Prevention	Detection
Jamming	Spread Spectrum Cryptography Schedule Switching Error Bit Correction	Jamming Rule Negative Selection Process CuSum
Tempering	Tamper Proofing	



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility





Link Layer Security Measures

Prevention	Detection
Error Correction Code	CuSum
Rate Limiting Time Division Transmission	Interval Rule CuSum Radio Interference
Small frames	
Fail to notify upper layers Dynamic Rate Limit	

	Prevention	Detection
Collision	Error Correction Code	CuSum
Exhaustion	Rate Limiting Time Division Transmission	Interval Rule CuSum Radio Interference
Unfairness	Small frames	
Interrogation	Fail to notify upper layers Dynamic Rate Limit	







Network and Routing Layer Security Measures

	Prevention	Detection
Neglect and Greed	Multiple Routing Paths Sending Redundant Messages	Interval Rule
Homing	Cryptography	
Misdirection	Egress Filtering Authentication Technique Routing update message freshness mechanism	
Selective Forward	Multipath Routing Diversity Coding	Specification based Support Vector Machines Fixed Width Clustering Retransmission Rule End to end Probing Neighboring Monitoring







Network and Routing Layer Security Measures

Preventio

Blackhole Vormhole



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility

on	Detection
	Secure Verification of Location Support Vector Machines CuSum Retransmission Rule Negative Selection Process
	Packet Leashes Secure Verification of Location Radio Transmission Range Repetition Rule Negative Selection Process CuSum





Network and Routing Layer Security Measures

	Prevention	Detection
Sinkhole		Secure Verification of Location Specification Based Watchdogs Fuzzy Logic Data and Hop Inconsistencies Negative Selection Process Repetition Rule CuSum
Sybil	Radio Resource Testing Random Key Pre-distribution Registration	Secure Verification of Location Multi-layer information
HELLO Flood		CuSum Radio Transmission Range







Security and Privacy

- for malicious interventions.
- Some IoT application rely on accurate and on time information, for example:
 - Smart City
 - Smart Transportation
 - Monitoring critical infrastructures
 - Smart thermostat
- Loss of information can result to inaccurate environmental measurements and erroneous decision making.



• IoT is connected to the largest untrusted network, the Internet, making it more vulnerable and appealing





Secure Communication



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility





Communication protocols in the IoT.

IEEE 802.15.4


- PHY
- MAC

[1] Granjal, Jorge, Edmundo Monteiro, and Jorge Sá Silva. "Security for the internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues." IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17.3 (2015): 1294-1312.



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility







Communication protocols in the IoT.

6LoWPAN


 Adaptation between IPv6 and Link layer (MAC) and PHY)

[1] Granjal, Jorge, Edmundo Monteiro, and Jorge Sá Silva. "Security for the internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues." IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17.3 (2015): 1294-1312.



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility







Communication protocols in the IoT.

Network and Routing


 Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks (RPL)

[1] Granjal, Jorge, Edmundo Monteiro, and Jorge Sá Silva. "Security for the internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues." IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17.3 (2015): 1294-1312.



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility







Communication protocols in the IoT.

Application


- Web protocols
- MQTT
- XMPP
- DPWS
- CoRE CoAP

[1] Granjal, Jorge, Edmundo Monteiro, and Jorge Sá Silva. "Security for the internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues." IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 17.3 (2015): 1294-1312.



Co-financed by the European Union


Connecting Europe Facility







End to End IoT Communication



* Modified image from [2]

[2] Raza, Shahid, et al. "Secure communication for the Internet of Things—a comparison of link-layer security and IPsec for 6LoWPAN." Security and Communication Networks 7.12 (2014): 2654-2668.







IEEE 802.15.4 PHY

- Manages
 - Physical Radio Frequency (RF) transceiver of the sensing device
 - Channel selection
 - Energy and Signal
- Reliability modules
 - Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSS)
 - Direct Sequence Ultra-Wideband (UWB)
 - Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS)
- No Security at the PHY



IEEE 802.15.4 MAC

- Manages
 - Data Service
 - Accesses to the physical channel
 - Network beaconing
 - Validation of frames
 - Guaranteed time slots
 - Node association
 - Security





Link – layer security protocol services

- Access Control
 - Should prevent unauthorized parties from participating in the network
 - MAC = message authentication code
 - Encryption
- Message Integrity
 - Detect possible message tampering
 - MAC = message authentication code
 - Encryption



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

- Confidentiality
 - Keeping information secret
 - Cryptography Semantic Security
- Replay Protection
 - The replay attack is when an adversary eavesdrop on a legitimate message sent between two devices and replays it
 - MAC with a monotonically increasing number to each packet





- Symmetric Cryptography at the hardware sensing platforms
 - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cypher
- Security is specified by the application



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility





IEEE 802.15.4 Security

Security Suites

- No Security
- AES-CTR
 - Encryption only
- AES-CBC-MAC
 - Authentication only
- AES-CCM
 - Encryption and authentication

Name
Null
AES-C
AES-CE
AES-CE
AES-CE
AES-CO
AES-CO
AES-CO

[3] Sastry, Naveen, and David Wagner. "Security considerations for IEEE 802.15. 4 networks." Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security. ACM, 2004.



Co-financed by the European Union

Connecting Europe Facility

	Description
	No security
ΓR	Encryption only, CTR Mode
BC-MAC-128	128 bit MAC
BC-MAC-64	64 bit MAC
BC-MAC-32	32 bit MAC
CM-128	Encryption & 128 bit MAC
CM-64	Encryption & 64 bit MAC
CM-32	Encryption & 32 bit MAC





Link – layer security protocol services

- Access Control
 - ACL Access Control List
- Confidentiality, Message Integrity
 - AES-CCM-32/64/128
- Replay Protection
 - Enable when using a security suite that provides confidentiality protection such as:
 - AES-CTR
 - AES-CCM-32/64/128



Co-financed by the European Union



Address	Security Suite	Key	Last IV	Replay Ctr

[3] Format of an ACL entry








6LoWPAN Security

- No Security mechanisms
- Research methods have been proposed









Network and Routing Security

- Routing Over Low-power and Lossy Networks (ROLL)
- Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL)
 - Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG)
 - Based on a rank metric using distance
 - Control messages
 - Security field in control messages
 - Security Modes:
 - Unsecured
 - Preinstalled
 - Authenticated



Co-financed by the European Union





Application Security

- The Constrained Application (CoAP) protocol
 - REST Web architecture
 - Currently defined only for the UDP communications over 6LoWPAN
 - Ongoing research for TCP for 6LoWPAN environments
 - Security in CoAP
 - DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
 - **Replay Attacks**
 - AES/CCM cryptographic algorithm



Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Non-Repudiation and Protection against





Application Security

- CoAP security modes
 - NoSec: No Security
 - PreSharedKey (PSK): pre-shared symmetric key
 - RawPublicKey (RSK): pre-shared asymmetric key
 - Certificates: authentication



red symmetric key red asymmetric key





Application Security

- Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT)
- Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP—RFC 3920),

• DPWS








Security and Privacy in IoT

- Vulnerabilities
- Research proposals
- IoT Security guidelines







MAI4CAREU

Master programmes in Artificial Intelligence 4 Careers in Europe

Summary

- Introduction
- Types of Attacks
- Intrusion Detection System
- Secure Communication



Co-financed by the European Union Connecting Europe Facility

